Founding fathers of scientific thinking - John Duns Scotus

The academic life of John Duns Scotus is well documented, he produced a multiplicity of texts. He was a theological baccalaureate, studied and lectured in Oxford, Paris, Cambridge and Cologne.

Scotus’s pursuit of logic through the argumentation confined in the realm of medieval thinking patterns, he seeks logic through concept formation. His main idea is a deviation between differences in personal experience and “univocity of being”, that allows to construct an understanding of the idea of God and creation that is connected, but separate by nature.

Scotus was heavily influenced by Franciscan tradition and theology of Thomas Aquinas.

Bio

"Church and faith, mendicancy and theology were Duns’ cradle.The young John followed Christ in the footsteps of il poverello. He was born in the South of Scotland, named Duns, baptized John in the autumn of 1265 or the winter of 1266 and – later – called Scotus (§1.2). For many years, Duns studied theology and philosophy in Oxford and was ordained a priest in 1291 (§1.3). He had already produced many logical writings at an early stage of his theological studies (§1.4). He was selected to become a master of divinity at Oxford and delivered a masterly course on systematic theology which would change his life and interrupt his Oxonian and English career (§1.5). His early Lectura I–II are the key to this revolutionary turn in John Duns’ life (§1.6). He acted as a baccalaureus biblicus and a bac- calaureus formatus at Oxford University (§1.7). Duns eventually left the pearl of England for Paris and the epilogue to the chapter underlines the synthetic nature of his personal stance and development (§1.8).
1.2 A SCOTTISH BOY
The Franciscan movement reached England in 1224, five years after it had reached Paris, and within twenty years the Friars Minor had settled at the two university towns, fifteen cathedral cities and twenty-five county towns. All over Europe, the Franciscans eventually numbered about forty thousand. Their quantitative success equalled their intellectual achievements. Franciscan theologians creatively contributed to the renewal of Oxonian theology. During the generations between Richard Rufus and Duns Scotus the professionalization of theology was perhaps less striking, but still very solid. The Franciscan renewal was welcomed both by many families and by inspired individuals. It also touched the gentry family of Duns in the South of Scotland, who supported the Franciscan movement on both the personal and the practical and financial levels.
1.2.1 Iohannes/John
Between November 1265 and March 1266, a new scion was born to the Duns family of Berwickshire: John. As in the case of Socrates and Jesus, the suggestion that there never was a John (Duns Scotus) has been totally refuted, although, in the wake of Renan, Allan Wolter rightly pointed out that little biographical material concerning Duns isstillavailable. He was born in the second half of the 1260s and he was baptized Iohannes.
1.2.2 Duns b. 1265/1266
Proposing a reliable hypothesis concerning the year of Duns’ birth is not an easy affair. The upshot of historical research after taking great trouble in order to establish hard facts concludes that the date of Duns’ ordination must be the precise point of departure for a reliable hypothesis: 17 March 1291. In the thirteenth century, one had to be twenty-five years of age in order to be ordained a priest. So John Duns must have been twenty-five halfway through March 1291. During mid-December 1290 his bishop had also ordained other young theologians but Duns had not been one of them. While statistically we have to put the date of John’s birth between the middle of December 1265 and 17 March 1266, we may prudently opt for the winter of 1266, although we cannot exclude the autumn of 1265. Historically, the only safe statement is that Duns was born ‘in 1265/1266. John Duns was a member of the flourishing Franciscan province of England which included Scotland at that time. The custodia of North England and South Scotland belonged to the English Province."
Vos, A., The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus - Edinburgh University Press 2006, pp. 16-18

New argument pathway

John Scots differ from his contemporaries in his understanding of scientific approach.

Scotus' proposition consists of the need for a frame of reference prior to approaching an abstract concept. Although, in his case, “God’ is unknowable in his entity, we can take an approach to this idea that is based on our interpretation of creation and deduce basic logic that makes order in the world around us. This makes a connection of micro to macro level of nature, however his “univocity” concept makes it into a stretch.

He seporated ideas of metaphysical and natural laws, stating preority iof natural laws over metaphysical, that in his view will set the limit of diversification of the argumentation.

"Natural theology is, roughly, the effort to establish the existence and nature of God by arguments that in no way depend on the contents of a purported revelation. But is it even possible for human beings to come to know God apart from revelation? Scotus certainly thinks so. Like any good Aristotelian, he thinks all our knowledge begins in some way with our experience of sensible things. But he is confident that even from such humble beginnings we can come to grasp God.
Scotus agrees with Thomas Aquinas that all our knowledge of God starts from creatures, and that as a result we can only prove the existence and nature of God by what the medievals call an argument quia (reasoning from effect to cause), not by an argument propter quid (reasoning from essence to characteristic). Aquinas and Scotus further agree that, for that same reason, we cannot know the essence of God in this life. The main difference between the two authors is that Scotus believes we can apply certain predicates univocally—with exactly the same meaning—to God and creatures, whereas Aquinas insists that this is impossible, and that we can only use analogical predication, in which a word as applied to God has a meaning different from, although related to, the meaning of that same word as applied to creatures. (See medieval theories of analogy for details.)
Scotus has a number of arguments for univocal predication and against the doctrine of analogy (Ordinatio 1, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–2, nn. 26–55). One of the most compelling uses Aquinas’s own view against him. Aquinas had said that all our concepts come from creatures. Scotus says, very well, where will that analogous concept come from? It can’t come from anywhere. If all our concepts come from creatures (and Scotus doesn’t deny this), then the concepts we apply to God will also come from creatures. They won’t just be like the concepts that come from creatures, as in analogous predication; they will have to be the very same concepts that come from creatures, as in univocal predication. Those are the only concepts we can have—the only concepts we can possibly get. So if we can’t use the concepts we get from creatures, we can’t use any concepts at all, and so we can’t talk about God—which is false.
Another argument for univocal predication is based on an argument from Anselm. Consider all predicates, Anselm says. Now get rid of the ones that are merely relatives, since no relative expresses the nature of a thing as it is in itself. (So we’re not talking about such predicates as “supreme being” or “Creator,” since even though those properly apply to God, they don’t tell us anything about what God is in himself, only about how he is related to other things.) Now take the predicates that are left. Here’s the test. Let F be our predicate-variable. For any F, either
(a) It is in every respect better to be F than not to be F. ~or~ (b) It is in some respect better to be not-F than F.
A predicate will fall into the second category if and only if it implies some sort of limitation or deficiency. Anselm’s argument is that we can (indeed must) predicate of God every predicate that falls into the first category, and that we cannot predicate of God any predicate that falls into the second (except metaphorically, perhaps). Scotus agrees with Anselm on this point (as did Aquinas: see SCG I.30). Scotus has his own terminology for whatever it is in every respect better to be than not to be. He calls such things “pure perfections” (perfectiones simpliciter). A pure perfection is any predicate that does not imply limitation.
So Scotus claims that pure perfections can be predicated of God. But he takes this a step further than Anselm. He says that they have to be predicated univocally of God; otherwise the whole business of pure perfections won’t make any sense. Here’s the argument. If we are going to use Anselm’s test, we must first come up with our concept—say, of good. Then we check out the concept to see whether it is in every respect better to be good than not-good. We realize that it is, and so we predicate ‘good’ of God. That test obviously won’t work unless it’s the same concept that we’re applying in both cases.
...
But these are all composite concepts; they all involve putting two quite different notions together: ‘highest’ with ‘good’, ‘first’ with ‘cause’, and so on. Scotus says that we can come up with a relatively simple concept that is proper to God alone, the concept of “infinite being.” Now that concept might seem to be every bit as composite as “highest good” or “first cause,” but it’s really not. For “infinite being” is a concept of something essentially one: a being that has infinity (unlimitedness) as its intrinsic way of existing."
Williams, Thomas., John Duns Scotus (Article) - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.) 2022, WEB 2023

Another step that promoted evolution of scientific-oriented thinking - separation of idea of “perfection of God” and consistency of processes of nature.

Observational experiences that have been thoroughly documented at that time accepted the impossibility of suspension of “natural law”, and rationalized it to be in accordance with the existence of God and ability to understand “his will”, giving God a nominal power over nature and “moral and necessary truths” (Williams, 2023).

Natural Law

Scotus continued development of his argument by separating the idea of “universal” based on predictability, however he borrows this view from Ibn Sina (as many of his contemporaries did). He states that categorization of nature is not natural, but stems from the intellect that observes logic of continuity and predictability.

"It is with these issues in mind that Scotus offers his most revealing discussion of the natural law. According to Scotus, God has in fact offered dispensations from the law. Dispensation may take two forms: God can revoke the law, or God can clarify the law. However, even God is limited in the extent to which he can dispense. That is because the natural law in the strict sense consists of laws known through themselves on the basis of their terms. Because they are logically necessary truths, they cannot be revoked, at the very least. Scotus takes the first two commandments of the Decalogue to belong to the law of nature in the strict sense. The commandment to love God, for example, exemplifies the principle that what is best is to be loved most, which is known through itself. Even God could not make it licit to hate him.
The natural law in the broad sense consists of laws that are “exceptionally harmonious” with the natural law in the strict sense. These laws are not known through themselves on the basis of their terms; their truth value is contingent. Therefore, God can grant dispensations from these laws, which include all the commandments in the second table of the Decalogue. Unfortunately, Scotus does not explain what he means when he says that the law of nature in the broad sense consists of laws that are “exceptionally harmonious” with the law of nature in the strict sense, and his vagueness has inspired astoundingly different interpretations of his account of natural law.
In some texts, Scotus presents a view of moral goodness that appears to be largely naturalistic. For example, in his 18th Quodlibet, Scotus writes that an agent’s act is morally good if it has an appropriate object, is performed in appropriate circumstances, is of a sort appropriate for the agent to perform, and furthermore if the agent rightly judges this to be the case and then acts on that judgment. To make these judgments about appropriateness, one needs to know only the nature of the agent, of the act, and of the power through which the agent performs the act. The moral law in its broad sense is therefore based on the natures of things and is accordingly rationally accessible to humans. On this interpretation, since human nature and human powers remain constant, the law of nature in the broad sense could change only if circumstances change, rendering appropriate what used to be inappropriate (or vice versa); in that case, however, God’s act of dispensation would seem little more than a formality."
Hause, J., John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) (Article) - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and its Authors 2023, WEB 2023

Universals

The universals as we understand today had different meanings for Scotus's: “universal” in his view is something that consists of identical parts and reflects them.

When it applies to universality of nature and “natural law”, Scotus concludes that this cannot happen by accident and require some type of common cause. Although his explanations lead back to the theological realm, we can see that this understanding anticipates the theory of evolution of life.

"Although common natures are not in themselves individuals, since their proper unity is less than numerical, they are not in themselves universals, either. Following Aristotle, Scotus holds that what is universal is what is one in many and said of many. As Scotus understands this account, a universal F must have the indifference to be predicable in a first mode predication statement of individual Fs in such a way that the universal and each particular are identical. As Cross points out [2002], the sort of identity at work here is representational: The universal F represents each individual F equally well. Scotus contends that no common nature can be universal in this way. True, a common nature has a certain sort of indifference: It is not incompatible with any common nature that it be contracted by some individuator other than the one that does in fact contract it. However, with the exception of the Divine Essence, which is predicable of each Divine Person, only a concept has the indifference to be predicable in the way a universal is predicable.
Although Scotus originates this distinction between universals and common natures, he finds his inspiration for it in Avicenna’s famous assertion that “horseness is just horseness.” As Scotus understands this claim, common natures are indifferent to individuality or universality. Although they cannot actually exist except as individuated or as universal, they are not individuated or universal of themselves. For this reason Scotus characterizes universality and individuality as accidental to the common nature and, therefore, as needing a cause. It is the intellect that causes the common nature to be universal by conceptualizing it under the mode of universality, that is, in such a way that numerically one concept is predicable of a plurality of individuals."
Hause, J. , John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) (Article) - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and its Authors 2023, WEB 2023

Semantics

John Scotus theoretic pursuits require a set of definitions that deal with semantic contradictions. He constructed a frame of argumentation that separated mutually exclusive logical «‎units», however this way of comprehension of what is certain and what is not, is based on the straight-forward logic:

This artificial “unit” doesn't serve as a building block of knowledge;
Sets the limit of debatable space that polarize logic;
Only single position is presumed acceptable.

When applied to the metaphysical (or abstract) idea, it divides the argument into possible or impossible states, that leaded him to development of «‎Conceptus univocus»

"When we characterize God as being and when we characterize Duns as being, we do not use two concepts of being. Duns makes use of the terms conceptus communis and conceptus univocus. If a common concept (conceptus communis) is applicable to a, then there must be a b to which it is applicable too, but what does Duns mean by conceptus univocus?
«‎A univocal concept [conceptus univocus] is a concept which forms a unit in such a way that its unity safeguards a contradiction by affirming and denying it about the same.»
Duns is not interested in caviling about words (Ordinatio I 3.26). According to his conception, univocity is simply required in order to formulate a decent contradiction and a decent inference. ‘Univocity has to be understood in this sense’ (ibid.). Otherwise, God is good and God is not good are both acceptable and an inference like God is my rock and my rock is my property – therefore God is my property – could be valid. Either all kinds of contradictions flow from the rejected view, or contradictions are simply impossible. In all cases of doubt or difference of opinion, I am certain and uncertain about the same. The philosophers disagreed on the issue of the first principle, but all looked on their own first principle as being. Only the absence of semantic ambiguity makes rival theories debatable. Only conceptual univocity makes it possible to argue for certain views and to refute or to confirm certain solutions."
Vos, A., The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus - Edinburgh University Press 2006, p. 287

However, Scotus went a bit further. When trying to justify his univocal principles that started to contradict with the existing theological system, he justifies it by unbounding God from his «‎creation».

He steps into way of trilectical argumentation by separating God, creation and “pure perfection”, sort of the measure of what it means to be God, that should have existed prior to God to be applicable to eternal God (although, he didn’t state it this way).

Scotus didn’t seem to realize in his further deliberations that the totality of this argument brought into question not only natural theology, but the whole construct of the prime mover and the necessity of this idea to explain the source and existence of the Universe.

Problems of Analogy and Equivocity

Nevertheless, the significance of this logic pathway is that it takes thinking away from the Aristotelian categorization to a different model. This way he separate reality from concepts, implying that between spoken or written word and concepts they describe, might be unevident and significant difference. Hence, our experience and interpretation of reality can be formulated into a priori distorted concepts.

"Scotus finds that unless the concept of being is univocal, both philosophy and natural theology come to ruin, a startling claim in light of the fact that the prevailing mediaeval view up to that time was that philosophy and theology would come to ruin if the concept of being was univocal. Mediaeval philosophers before Scotus commonly thought that the concept of being must be not univocal or equivocal, but analogical: While it is not a pure accident that it applies to such diverse items as donkeys (substances) and dispositions (stubbornness), as well as to both creatures and God, it nevertheless does not apply to these diverse items in the same way. If it did, then being would be a genus, and the various Aristotelian categories would not be fundamentally diverse, but just different species of a single genus. Aristotelian ontology, the foundation of mediaeval philosophy since Alcuin, would have to be scrapped and a new ontology developed to replace it.
The consequences for natural theology would be even direr. Without a univocal concept of being, it would be impossible to construct an a posteriori argument for God’s existence, one that took as its premises facts about the existence of finite creatures. Moreover, unless other concepts besides that of being are univocally applicable to God and creatures, then the sort of philosophical theology exemplified by Anselm and the scholastic thinkers who followed him, meant not just to establish God’s existence but to elucidate his nature, would be impossible. Their universal practice is to discover God’s nature—what God is like in himself—by determining which perfections are pure perfections, perfections that imply no limitation whatsoever. An absolutely perfect God must have all pure perfections and only pure perfections, and so any attribute implying limitation does not characterize God as he is in himself. To determine which are the pure perfections, philosophical theologians use some version of this principle, which has its roots in Anselm (Monologion 15): F is a pure perfection if and only if it is in every respect better to be F than what is incompatible with F. Accordingly, because goodness, wisdom, and power satisfy this criterion for pure perfection, while corporeality and mobility do not, God is good, wise, and powerful, but not corporeal and mobile. However, no one can use the Anselmian criterion to determine what God is like without using concepts that apply univocally to God and creatures.
Scotus explains why this is so in the course of the Ordinatio’s fourth argument for univocity. Either the account of a pure perfection is (a) proper to creatures and inapplicable to God, (b) proper to God and inapplicable to creatures, or (c) univocally applicable to God and creatures. On the first option, whatever pure perfections one discovers by the Anselmian criterion are applicable only to creatures and not to God, a view Scotus finds absurd, presumably because God would not then be the most perfect of all beings possible. The second option, however, entirely rules out using the Anselmian criterion to discover the divine nature. If pure perfections are proper to God, then we must determine which attributes are pure perfections by seeing whether or not God has them. In contrast, to use the Anselmian criterion, one first determines whether or not an attribute is a pure perfection and only then concludes whether it is applicable to God. Options (a) and (b) bring natural theology to a halt because they preclude the use of the Anselmian criterion to discover God’s nature, but no such problems arise if our concepts of pure perfections apply univocally to God and creatures."
Hause, J., John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) (Article) - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and its Authors 2023, WEB 2023

Logic

Scotus developed 4 logical models:

Direct succession;
Unification;
Divisional;
Relational.

There’s a problem with the subtlety of Scotus' writing and still a subject of debate - interpretation of his logic falls back on itself when analyzed only through a metaphysical lens. This division does not seem to be arbitrary, moreover, it corresponds with understating of universals and “perfection”, that can't be manifested by language.

(In the following excerpts, author provides an opposite interpretation of this division with reference to Ockham, that reality is properly explained by the spoken word, a misconception of Scotus's model)

"We meet in Duns Scotus’ theory of meaning the very unusual phenomenon of a chain of differing views, running from the orientation on Aristotle in his early Super primum librum Perihermenias Quaestiones to his final view in Ordinatio I 27 where both the theory that a word signifies a mental idea or species intelligibilis and the idea signifies what is real, and the theory that a spoken word signifies only what is real and not an inner concept, are rejected.
The general background is formed by the Aristotelian model, supported by Boethius. ‘Is it so that the spoken word “tree” immediately signifies the concept tree, and that only the concept or mental language-sign “tree” signifies immediately the things which are trees? This question was, as it seems, unanimously affirmed, at least by the great Scholastics before Scotus,’43 although we have to make an exception for Henry of Ghent. The Ordinatio I 27 view is characterized by Nuchelmans as saying that what is signified by the spoken sound is a thing rather than a concept. Bos added to this tantalizingly brief exposition a remarkable consideration.
Nuchelmans only signaled Duns’ Ordinatio I 27 point of view, the developmental death us Bos's point. So, let us list the differences of the four main models in operation:
Cf. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 196, and Vos, ‘On the Philosophy of the Young Duns Scotus,’ in Bos (ed.),
These models deserve some comments, as follows.
Model II
Model II challenges the basic model I inherited from ancient philosophy. Model II is the basically Christian challenger which achieves a radical breakthrough, but even when Duns had said goodbye to the ancient model, model III and model IV are evidence that he is too prudent to accept model II simply as it stands, just as model III of Lectura I 27 and model IV of Ordinatio I 27 show. Duns also rejected the early nominalist stance. The unique series of drafts show how much effort all these attempts cost.
Model III
The two key concepts of this model are: immediacy and priority. In this model, the direct semantic relation between a word and something real, between language and reality, is accepted, but is not cut off from the dimension of the concept. On the contrary, the same relation is now applied both to what is real and to the concept. However, the first semantic relation of word-reality enjoys priority.
Model IV
The key viewpoints of this model are: immediately and properly. In this model alone, all three – the written sign, the spoken sign, and the mental sign – signify immediately what is in reality, but only a spoken word signifies properly what is in reality. Nuchelmans stressed the evident differences between Aristotle and Scotus/ Ockham, but he continues by describing Ockham’s theory, for Ockham assumes that
there is a direct relation between written or spoken terms and things as well as between mental terms and things, one difference being that in the first case the relation is that of conventional signification and in the second case that of natural signification."
Vos, A., The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus - Edinburgh University Press 2006, pp. 164-167

Soctus also approached the concepts of relativity, that he developed through the idea of divided sense. His analytical function corresponds with traditional composite sense (Vos, 2006). The structure of categorical relations consists of:

term;
foundation;
observer;

a “Trinity” that is familiar to us today, that serve as basis for modern scientific theories.

"Present logic of relation has no true counterpart in ancient Greek, medieval and early modern philosophy before Frege and Russell. The predominance of Aristotelian syllogistics and theories of substance and accident do not seem to be profitable for the development of a theory of relation, but several central parts of Christian theology need an articulate theory of relation. Duns’ theory of relation, distinction and identity is marked by a special historical importance. We may discern a widespread search of it in Scotus’ thought.
However, we meet again the traditional obstacle that, on the one hand, many technical terms of medieval philosophy seem to be overspecialized, while, on the other hand, prima facie they do not provide the shades of meaning the modern mind is looking for. So, we have to pay close attention to the meanings of the key terms of the theory. Duns’ difficult technical terminology is notorious and, against different semantic backgrounds, his theories patently sound absurd. The theory of relation is also the context of the famous formalis distinctio a parte rei (see §§6.6–6.7 and §7.6).
Terms like relatio, relativum, extremum, fundamentum, terminus, realis, and relatio rationis look rather general, but in fact they are specific and we can even get the impression that they are too specific to handle the theory in a natural way. This feature is the more demanding because these terms play an important part in quite different contexts: the ontology of properties and of creatures, the theology of creation because of the relationship between God and his creation and the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus the theory of relation has to cope with complex challenges.
Time and again, Scotus’ thought transcends the boundaries of the theories of the Categoriae. In Duns’ theory of relation we meet a definite set of technical terms. Let us introduce some elements of his theory of relation: relatio (relation), referri (have a relation to), extremum (term), fundamentum (foundation) and terminus (end term). In terms of the formal pattern of a particular relation aRb we elucidate these expressions and their translations. In aRb, R is the relation as it runs from a to b. Duns has a lot to say on the different properties of the relationship running from a to b and the relationship as it runs from b to a. of a relation, just as the extrema are the terms of a proposition – e.g. in a proposition of the form aRb the components a and b are the terms (extrema) of relation R. The relation R is anchored in the fundamentum of the relation R. The fundamentum of R is the nature of a which entails a, R and b (see §7.6).
Simple examples of relatives (relativa) are similar and dissimilar, equal and unequal. When a and b are relatives, because they are similar then a symmetrical relation obtains of both a and b: if a is like b then b is like a, and if a is unequal to b then b is unequal to a. The same is required of both terms of the relation in the same way.
In God relativa are different. Again and again, theology asks more than the old doctrine of the categories can give. For this reason even the characterization ‘categorial relation’ can be misleading. Such relations seem to have walked away from Aristotle’s theory of categories; however, we have to dig out the presuppositions of understanding e mente auctoris, the auctor being the medieval thinker in question and primarily not Aristotle. This is true of Duns in a very specific way."
Vos, A., The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus - Edinburgh University Press 2006, pp. 189-

Scientific orientation

But Scotus, as well as his contemporaries, struggle to reconcile logical advancements with presuppositions of theology. Evolution of logic had to be held back by contradictions with accepted doctrines, ignoring their obvious flaws, by locking them as “self-evident”.

«‎The first observations are perfectly true, but, on Duns’ side, there is not a qualified ‘yes’ to the thesis that the theology of the Church is a science in its Aristotelian sense. O’Connor thinks that, from the point of view of Duns Scotus’ notions of science and the subject of a science, Scotus feels uneasy when confronted with the splendor and contingency of divine knowledge and the theologia contingens. Duns’ rebound does not consist in a qualification of affirmative answers, but in the revision of the involved concepts. If Aristotelian conditions do not satisfy the nature of God’s knowledge, exemplifying what theology as such is, then Duns simply drops the condition of deductively discovering and deriving conclusions and theses from premisses. Already in Lectura Prologus 107, Duns’ first statement was: as far as perfection is at stake, theology in itself is scientia. ‘Theology in itself’ is certain knowledge in virtue of the epistemic object which is evident in itself.»
Vos, A., The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus - Edinburgh University Press 2006, p. 353
There’s acceptance of the lack of demonstration of the argument that could be proven by debate, dismissing the priority of proof of extraordinary statements of faith. This necessitates Scots to make theology equal to science.
Argument, proof, and science 2 (John Duns Scotus)
"Duns makes the same argumentation theoretical move in Ordinatio I 42.16: there are arguments in the doctrine of the Trinity which are necessary and have sufficient argumentative force in order to prove something (ad probandum), but not sufficient argumentative force in order to demonstrate something, for although they are necessary, yet they are not evidently true. Duns makes the crucial point that necessity does not entail being self-evidently true. In Lectura I 42.19 a similar distinction is made:
Concerning the first argument we have to say that having a necessary argument and having a demonstrative argument which leads to an evident conclusion do not amount to the same thing. The reason is that a derived [mediata] proposition is only evident in the way that it leads to a proof [ad probandum] [. . .], if the direct [immediata] proposition on which it [namely the derived proposition] depends, were evident." Hause, J., The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus - Edinburgh University Press 2006, p. 338

The conclusion of contingency of natural laws is the most important in arguments of Scotus. His approach to similarity of micro and macro levels makes him deduce that matter and natural laws are similar throughout the Universe. Without any way to actually observe it or test it, Scotus relies on the same principles of “perfection” as other theists of his time. It remains to be seen if his hunch was similar to an Aristotle’s atomism.

«‎However, Scotus’ contributions were striking, in spite of being relatively modest. His articulation of ‘radical contingency’ gave rise to the view that natural laws are contingent. The chasm dividing the Christian approach to nature from the ancient idea of phusis was worded in much the same way as the ontological disagreements (§10.6). The material things of the world shine in a new manner, promoted from a kind of non-being to contingent individuals, enjoying individuality in their own right (§10.2; cf. Chapter 11). On many points, the thirteenth-century Aristotelian options in physics were minority reports and, again and again, Duns Scotus sided with the majority views and continually tried to improve on them: the specifically formal identity of matter and the homogeneity of matter throughout the universe (§10.2), the plurality thesis of forms (§10.4), and the new approach of accidental properties (§10.5). Scotus’ position ‘explains better than Henry’s theory the persistence of plant and non-human animal bodies through death.»
Vos, A., The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus - Edinburgh University Press 2006, p. 393-394

Conclusions

John Duns Scotus contribution into the development of scientific thought can be considered as significant in many ways.

Scotus' approach to abstract based on the construction of the frame of reference. This precedes the concept of evidence-based practice:

Description of observational bias - categorization is not natural but depend on the intellect;
Precursor to semantics - the literal meaning of “good” that connected to experience and contrasts with the universal concepts;
Precursor to general relativity - contingency of natural laws;
Theoretical structure - classification and clustering of concepts;